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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CABBERS-LIABILITY TO GRATUITOUS PASSENGER-DuTY OF CARE-[Fed-
eral].-Libelant asked for and received a free pass on the libelee's steam-
ship. On this pass was printed a contract which provided that the carrier
should not be liable for its own negligence or its agents' negligence. Held:
it was not against the public policy for a common carrier in interstate com-
merce or commerce with foreign nations to exempt itself from liability for
acts of negligence of itself or its agents to gratuitous passengers.'
The weight of authority upholds the validity of such contracts.2 The
reason given for this rule is that as no duty exists making it necessary to
carry gratuitous passengers, the carrier may refuse to carry them save
on its own terms.3 The New York courts hold to the majority rule with
great perseverance because of the aforementioned reason, yet the courts of
that state held a railroad liable, although it owed no duty to transport a
paying passenger who was violating a statute by travelling on Sunday, be-
cause the ".... law raises the duty (of care) out of regard for human life,
and for purpose of securing the utmost vigilance by carriers in protecting
those who have committed themselves to their hands."14 Some courts recog-
nize a distinction between the negligence of the carrier's agents and em-
ployes and the carrier's personal negligence, holding that such a stipulation
for exemption from liability will protect the carrier against the negligence
of any of its employees and agents, but not its managing officers and direc-
tors who are considered as being identical with the corporation itself.5 Many
states which uphold the majority rule will not allow the contract to relieve
the defendant from liability for gross, wilful, or wanton negligence.6 The
1. Stevens v. Colombian Mail S. S. Corp. et al., 15 Fed. Supp. 534 (D.
C. S. D. N. Y., May 19, 1936).
2. Goddard, Outlines of the Law of Bailments and Carriers (2nd ed.
by Ctllen, 1928) sec. 372, fn. 236.
3. Ibid., fn. 237. The court in Payne v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co., 157
Ind. 616, 620, 62 N. E. 472, 56 L. R. A. 472 (1902) declared that pass users
increase the burden of fare passengers or at least postpone the arrival of
cheaper rates. If these pass users could also get compensation for injuries
received through the negligence of the railways, the court believed that
they would create "a positive increase of disbursements, to be borne ulti-
mately by the general public." The New Jersey court in Kinney et al. v.
The Central R. Co. of N. J., 34 N. J. L. 513 (1869) felt still stronger on the
matter when it asserted that it was a breach of good faith for a gratuitous
passenger to hold the carrier liable for his injuries. The court went on to
say that non-liability for damage to an occasional free passenger would
not induce the slightest want of vigilance as any such carelessness would
result in untold loss to the carrier.
4. Carroll v. Railroad, 58 N. Y. 126, 17 Am. Rep. 221 (1874).
5. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (Student's ed. by John
Lewis, 1907) 727; Wells v. N. Y. Cent. R., 24 N. Y. 181 (1862); Perkins
v. N. Y. Cent. R., 24 N. Y. 196, 82 Am. Dec. 281 (1862); Smith v. N. Y.
Cent. R., 24 N. Y. 222 (1862). In the New Jersey cases of Kinney v. Cent.
R. Co., 32 N. J. L. 402 (1868), and S. C., 34 N. J. L. 513, 3 Am. Rep. 265
(1869) the issue as to the existence of such a distinction was mentioned,
but the court decided that there was no necessity of answering it.
6. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494, Ann.
Cas. 1915C 620 and note (1913); Okla. Stat. 1931, secs. 65, 66, & 9255; Ill.
Central R. Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484 (1865); and see Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v.
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courts of almost all states will, if they possibly can, find some consideration
for the pass in order that they can declare the passenger a paying passenger
instead of a gratuitous one, and thereby make the contract exempting the
carrier from liability invalid.7
In the state courts we find a variety of rulings and even a looseness and
conflict of rationale within certain jurisdictions. The Oklahoma courts, like
the federal courts, follow the majority rule.8 A line of Illinois decisions
also follows the strict federal ruling in regard to free passengers. In
the case of Pennsylvania Co. v. Purvis0 the court in general terms said
that the defendant company could not free itself by contract from its duty
of care. Little emphasis was put on the fact that the plaintiff was riding
on a free pass. These general statements lost much of their force when
the court determined the case on the ground that the infant passenger could
disaffirm the contract. The court further stated that the evidence war-
ranted a finding of gross negligence which would, in Illinois, have allowed
a recovery despite the contract exempting defendant from liability.1 In the
early case of Arnold v. L C. R. R. Co.12 the court used the same manner of
reasoning as it did in the cases dealing with free passengers holding that
as the railroad was not obliged to take a paying passenger on its freight
cars a contract exempting a railroad from liability for negligence would be
valid in that situation. But in a later case13 the Illinois court held that a
carrier will be held to the same degree of care in the case of a paying pas-
senger on a freight train as in the case of one on a passenger train. The
court, however, failed to mention the Arnold case. It remained for Illinois
Cen ral R. R. Co. v. Beebe'4 to say that the Arnold case was no longer law
in Illinois. In view of the Beebe case and the dicta in the Purvis case it
Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 66 Am. St. Rep. 258, 43 L. R. A. 213, 50 N. E. 1022(1898); but see Pennsylvania Co. v. Purvis, 128 Ill. App. 367 (1906) in
which court cited authorities to effect that all negligent acts of railways
were gross when the passenger was not at fault; and Bryan v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co., 32 Mo. App. 228 (1888).
7. Binder v. Union Pac. R. Co., 108 Kans. 47, 194 Pac. 314 (1920) ; Little
Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 320, 48 Am. Rep. 11 (1883) ; N. Y. C. &
L. R. Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 Ill. 40, 43 N. E. 809 (1895); Carroll v. Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 239, 57 Am. Rep. 382 (1885) ; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.
v. Kerns, 41 Okla. 167, 136 Pac. 169 (1913) ; Powell v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
255 Mo. 420, 164 S. W. 628 (1914); and Del. etc. R. Co. v. Ashley, 67 F.
212 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1895); contra, Smith v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 222
(1862).
8. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494, Ann.
Cas. 1915C 620 and note; and M. K. T. Ry. Co. v. Zuber, 76 Okla. 146, 184
Pac. 452, 7 A. L. R. 840 (1919), appeal dismissed, 41 S. Ct. 322, 255 U. S.
561, 65 L. ed. 786, and writ of error dismissed, 41 S. Ct. 449, 256 U. S. 681,
65 L. ed. 1169 (1921). Okla. Stat., 1931, sec. 9255.
9. Leading case is Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484 (1865).
10. 128 Ill. App. 367 (1906).
11. Supra, note 6.
12. 83 Ill. 273, 25 Am. Rep. 383 (1876).
13. N. Y., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 Ill. 40, 43 N. E. 809
(1895).
14. 174 Ill. 13, 66 Am. St. Rep. 258, 43 L. R. A. 213, 50 N. E. 1022.
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seems that the Illinois courts may in future cases adopt the minority ruling.
The Missouri and Arkansas holdings, the latter being based on constitu-
tional and statutory provisions,' 5 follow the minority rule and hold that it
is against public policy to limit the common law liability of common car-
riers even in the case of gratuitous passengers.' 6 In Kansas there have
been no cases which deal with gratuitous passengers. But the supreme court
of that state refused to allow a railroad to exempt itself from liability for
negligence in the case of a passenger riding on a reduced fare unless the
railroad could obtain the permission of the Board of Railroad Commission-
ers in accordance with a statute. 7 Nor will the courts of that state allow
railroads to limit their common law duties in the case of paying passengers
who ride in cabooses beyond that limitation designated by statute.' 8 By
analogy it would seem that the Kansas courts would adhere to the minority
rule for in all these cases the railroad was not duty bound to transport
the passenger.
Although the courts which follow the majority view make much of the
fact that the carrier is not obligated to transport the gratuitous passenger,
it seems that that fact is immaterial. The fact is that the carrier does
carry him. While it is true that the addition of a gratuitous passenger will
not make the carrier less careful than it would ordinarily be, this should
be no valid reason for exempting the carrier from liability to the free pas-
senger. "The state has an interest of the highest degree in the preserva-
tion of its citizens' lives... 1 9 and this interest is not lessened because some
citizens may choose to ride on a free pass. If diligence was to be graduated
to the argount paid for passage it is conceivable that the carrier could be
reckless in regard to a pass using traveler. 20 But as most of these cases
fall under the federal jurisdiction because they involve interstate travel,2
it is doubtful whether the majority rule will soon be abolished, for the fed-
eral courts hold very tenaciously to the illiberal view. W. B. M.
15. Const. of Ark., art. 17, sec. 12 and Kirby's Digest, sec. 6773.
16. Bryan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Mo. App. 228 (1888); R. S. Mo. 1929,
sec. 3278; St. L. etc. R. Co. v. Pitcock, 82 Ark. 411, 101 S. W. 725, 118 Am.
R. 84, 12 Ann. Cas. 582 and note (1907); Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Steel,
108 Ark. 14, 156 S. W. 182, Am. Cas. 1915B 198; Dodson v. Clark County
Lumber Co., 122 Ark. 612, 184 S. W. 417 (1916) distinguished from Pitcock
case as this did not involve a common carrier. In Alexander v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Co., 221 Mo. App. 271, 2 S. W. (2d) 165 (1928) the court
held in case falling under Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584, 49 U. S. C. A. secs. 1,
6, 11, 15, 16, 16 (a), 18, 20, 41 (1906) that the carrier could not purchase
immunity from liability by reducing the fare. This is in accordance with
the Missouri holdings. But the dicta followed the rule in the federal courts,
stating that it was only where a carrier takes a gratuitous passenger that
the carrier is competent to exempt itself by contract from liability.
17. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kans. 449, 53 Pac. 465 (1898);
General Statutes of 1897, ch. 69, sec. 17.
18. Davis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 81 Kans. 505, 106 Pac. 288
(1910).
19. Sherman & Redfield, Law of Negligence, 1367.
20. Wharton, Law of Negl~cence, 517-8.
21. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459,.43 S. Ct.
176, 67 L. ed. 348 (1923) interpreting Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584, 49 U. S.
C. A. secs. 1, 6, 11, 15, 16, 16 (a), 18, 20, 41 (1906).
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